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Imaging Madness: Inter-ships Mieke 
Bal Inter-mediality is just another form 
of “inter-ship” that, like the international 
life I lead, the inter-disciplinary work I 
do, in particular inter-arts analysis, the 
inter-generational trauma I will come to 
talk about, the inter-temporal mutuality 
I have called “pre-posterous history”: all 
these, like the inherent inter-mediality of 
audio-visual media, indicate relationships, 
mutuality, exchange and dialogue, more 
than plurality, multitude, and whatever is 
indicated through the preposition “trans-.” df 
I insist on the specific relationality of “inter-” 
and its distinctive operations between the 
members it connects. I am interested in 
how images help articulate and embody 
thought. I contend that images can perform 
an equivalent of speech acts; that they can 
respond (“speak back”) to the look cast onto 
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1. For the idea of the 
performativity of 
images, modelled 
on speech act theory, 
see J. L. Austin, How 
to Do Things with 
Words, Second Edition, 
(Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 
1971);1962. Mieke Bal, 
Travelling Concepts 
in the Humanities: A 
Rough Guide, (Toronto: 
Toronto University 
Press, 2002). For the 
concept of ‘“theoretical 
object,’” see Hubert 
Damisch in Bois, 
Yve-Alain, et al. ‘A 
Conversation with 
Hubert Damisch,’ 
October 85, (Summer), 
1998: 3-17. 
2. Jacques Derrida, 
Limited Inc, trans. 
Samuel Weber and 
Jeffrey Mehlman 
(Evanston, Il: 
Northwestern 
University Press, 1988); 
Judith Butler, Gender 
Trouble, (Oxford: 
Routledge, 2006); 
Bodies That Matter, 
(Oxford: Routledge, 
2011). For an excellent 
overview of this 
travel of the concept 
of performativity, 
see Jonathan Culler, 
‘Philosophy and 
Literature: The Fortunes 
of the Performative,’ 
Poetics Today, vol. 
21, no. 3, (Fall) 2000: 
503-519. See also the 
chapter “Performance 
and Performativity”
them, and that they can entice viewers to theorize. They are performative. 
They do something; they act. I call such “speaking images,” which speak 
back, resist (parts of) my interpretation of them, and make me think, 
“theoretical objects.”1
I took this view one step further when, in an inter-ship for which I have 
not yet a name, I began to supplement my research into contemporary 
(migratory) culture with filmmaking. I considered (documentary) 
filmmaking as a form of research. The term “auto-theory” indicates a form 
of thinking that integrates my own practice of image-making as a form 
of thinking, and reflecting on what I have made as a continuation of the 
making. Auto-theory is not self-indulgent navel gazing because of the 
concept of images as performative that underlies it, and through which 
the relationship between the films and the intellectual reflection remains 
dialogic. The present essay is an example of auto-theory in this sense.
It is widely known that the concept of performativity has been taken 
up in philosophy and cultural studies, particularly in feminist and queer 
studies, under the influence primarily of Judith Butler. Following Derrida’s 
commentary on Austin’s concept, Butler emphasized that it is not the 
exceptional speech act—“I declare war,” “I declare you husband and wife”—
but the routine, reiterated speech acts that determine who one is, including 
sexually. The habits of reiteration are open to (slow) change, however. 
Precisely by inhabiting a routine one can change it from within.2 
Images, the ensemble of images we call visual culture, participate in 
those routines and their changes. This performativity is significant more 
generally for images that, according to our ontological distinctions, do 
not (materially) exist, as is the case, at least in part, with the inter-ship 
I wish to discuss here, a propos of the film Mère folle. A second topic 
in this presentation will be the way in which space—again, taken to be 
performative—can be considered a medium. This has been experimented 
with in the video installation The Space In-Between, derived from the 
material of the film and exhibited in video exhibitions, including in DIT’s 
Broadcast Gallery (November 2011).
There was a series of images that came out of an activity of reading. This 
“coming out of reading” happened twice over. First, an author wrote a book 
in my book Travelling 
concepts in the 
humanities: a Rough 
guide, (Toronto: 
University of Toronto 
Press, 2002)
3. Françoise Davoine, 
1998. The film and 
installations are co-
authored. Mieke Bal 
& Michelle Williams 
Gamaker, 2011, A Long 
History of Madness. 
HD digital video, 
colour, sound, 120 
minutes. Multilingual, 
subtitles English, 
French, Spanish, Dutch, 
Finnish, Russian. 
Distributed by Films 
d’Atalante, Paris.
4. See, for example, 
Peirce, ‘Logic as 
Semiotic: The Theory of 
Signs,’ Philosophical 
Writings of Peirce, 
edited and with an 
introduction by J. 
Buchler, (New York: 
Dover Publications, 
1955). 
5. www.
crazymothermovie.
com, dir. Olli Heinola, 
Juho Heinola 
in which she described images that came out of her own readings. Second, I 
read that book, and images—the same ones? different ones?—came out of 
my reading of her readings. Except for the cover image, a detail from Pieter 
Breughel the Elder’s painting Dulle Griet (Mad Meg, 1562), there were 
no images, in the material sense, included in the book. Yet, these written 
images were so strong that after seeing them with my mind’s eye I had to 
make them, as “after-images” that were interpretants of the images evoked 
but not presented—even though technically, the book was a theoretical 
treatise.3
I use the term interpretant in the sense in which American philosopher 
Charles Sanders Peirce theorized the sign, in order to make the point that 
images can be signs even if they are not materially extant. Peirce starts his 
definition of the sign with a perceptible object. The question posed by this 
object—“What does it mean?”—cannot be answered by revealing something 
inherent in the object. Instead, the cultural group in which the object 
circulates works the meaning out in a practice that yields a second, further 
developed object. That second object, or sign, is the interpretant, a new 
sign developed on the basis of, and evoked by, the attempt to understand 
the first sign.4 Objects, hence also images, are active participants in the 
performance of analysis in that they enable reflection and speculation. They 
can contradict projections and wrong-headed interpretations (if the analyst 
lets them), and thus constitute a theoretical object with philosophical 
relevance, whether materially embodied or not. Hence, reflecting “from 
within,” as maker, on how these processes work is an activity steeped in a 
larger cultural context, not a self-indulgent intellectual autism. 
There are two further reasons why “auto-theory” is not individualistic 
self-reflection, and the images involved, by definition themselves subject 
to “inter-.” First, filmmaking is never something one does alone. For Mère 
folle, we had, for example, actors, both volunteers and professionals, we had 
help with script, camera, sound, translation, and there were people who 
made a superb website for the project.5 But most importantly, I am making 
this film with British artist Michelle Williams Gamaker. Michelle and I have 
been collaborating since 2002, the beginning of my practice in filmmaking, 
when Michelle was already a practicing (video) artist. Hence, when I use the 
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6. Marianna Torgovnick, 
‘The Politics of the 
We,’ South Atlantic 
Quarterly 91, (Winter) 
1992.  Torgovnick 
writes of the slide into 
we as “a covert, and 
sometimes coercive, 
universal”... the full 
deceptiveness of the 
false cultural ‘we’.” 
(265) As members of 
the collective Cinema 
Suitcase, Michelle 
Williams Gamaker and 
I collaborated on the 
films Mille et un jours 
(2004), Colony (2007), 
and Becoming Vera 
(2008). We have both 
made other films with 
other members of the 
collective, as well as 
individually (www.
cinemasuitcase.com).
7. I am aware that the 
more common term is 
“adaptation.” However, 
I choose to consider 
the film a translation, 
because of the specific 
issue the activity of 
translation entails, 
according to the 
Benjaminian stream 
of thought I engage 
here. Among many 
studies of adaptation, 
the following collection 
deserves attention. 
See Robert Stam and 
Allessandra Raengo, 
(eds.) 2005 Literature 
and Film: the Guide to 
the Theory and Practice 
of Film Adaptation, 
(Adapation. New York: 
Blackwell, 2005). 
pronoun “I” it should be heard as “we” in most cases. I cannot use “we” as 
this pronoun has been marred by the universalist “we” that strives to create 
a “we-feeling” that is in turn liable to constitute an exclusive audience and 
its manipulated benevolence. That is why I avoid it here. What I am going 
to say about the film is my own responsibility—hence the persistence of 
“I”—while the film as such is a collective work, and specifically the work of 
Michelle and myself in an equal partnership.6
Second, there is another intense partnership involved, which bears on 
the status and the nature of the images. The film is a “translation” of a book 
by French psychoanalyst Françoise Davoine, an act that has turned out best 
served in close collaboration with the author. The images she “saw,” or had 
in mind, when she wrote her book are inevitably very different from the 
ones that ended up in the film. There are several layers of interpretation and 
imagination between the one and the other. This is compounded by the fact 
that the author plays herself; but only after the images had circulated, and 
Michelle and I have transformed them, did they come back to the author, 
from the outside so to speak, who, playing her role, transformed them again. 
This is why the film images can only be what I call “after-images,” with 
several temporal and visual layers separating the “original” from the images 
in the film.7 
My attempt to develop “auto-theory” as a worthy methodological tool is 
also in line with a specific conception of the fundamental inter-temporality 
of images. Even a material painting existed once only in the artist’s mind, 
and then came off on canvas much different. That material painting then 
changes again with each act of viewing projected upon it, with time, place, 
and social circumstance of its subsequent “life” as a work of art. An image, 
in this sense, will always be in the process of “becoming.” By that Deleuzian 
term I mean something quite specific. Not only each artwork, but a priori 
the entire oeuvre of an artist is and remains in the process of becoming. The 
becoming of an oeuvre implies a retrospective temporal logic according to 
which each new work recasts the terms in which the previous works could 
be understood. For example, a next phase of becoming, at the same time 
as a preposterous dialogue between an earlier moment and our film, is the 
video installation Anacronismos/Anachronisms we made for a commission 
of the Guggenheim Bilbao museum (2010).8 Each new phase of that 
becoming is informed by a later work that retrospectively glosses an earlier 
work. Each new work puts a spin on the ensemble of what came before it. 
In that becoming as an oeuvre or a work consisting of multiple images, my 
theoretical object is the body of images named Mère folle, inflected by what 
“my work”—as a reader, co-filmmaker, and critic of the resulting images—
adds to and changes in that corpus. And, according to the retrospective 
logic I have elsewhere called “preposterous,” the beginning or starting 
point is the set of filmic images, followed by the images “we saw,” only 
then followed by those in the author’s book and ending with those images 
the author “saw,” and that are fundamentally inaccessible to me. It is this 
retrospective impact that is the point of studying an image as a source of 
further and more profound insight than the usual documentation can offer.9
Imaging Madness
This leads to the question: can one “image” madness? Davoine’s book, 
written in the first person, hovers between fiction and theory and integrates 
the best of both. We considered it a “theoretical fiction,” the term Freud uses 
frequently, for example, to explain the genre of Totem and Taboo, his story 
of the primitive band of sons in revolt, killing and eating the tyrannical 
father.10 Sometimes, Freud’s story intimates, it takes fiction or other forms of 
imaginative thought to understand that for which reason is too simple. This 
underwrites my deployment of video art to further analyse what cannot be 
studied easily in documentation. Davoine’s book, too, has theoretical points 
to make and uses speculation and fiction to develop, articulate, and make 
them, and subsequently so has (and does) our film. But, unlike Freud’s 
primary tool of plot, Davoine’s points are primarily made through images, 
not through discussion. The plot itself, not absent, serves, rather, to frame 
the images.11 
Like Davoine’s auto-fictional book—but not in the same 
autobiographical form—the film stages the inter-ship or intertwinement of 
two confrontations. One occurs between a psychoanalyst and her severely 
traumatized (“mad”) patients. The other confronts this contemporary world 
with medieval Fools, agents of a late-medieval political theatre. Most of the 
8. On “becoming,” 
see Gilles Deleuze 
and Félix Guattari, A 
Thousand Plateaus. 
tr. Brian Massumi, 
(Minneapolis: 
University of 
Minnesota Press,. 
1987), where they use 
that term throughout. 
For an argument about 
the transformative 
nature of images 
that supports an 
anti-intentionalist 
position, see Bal, 
Travelling Concepts 
in the Humanities 
(2002, 253-85). On the 
retrospective logic as a 
historical perspective, 
see M. Bal, ed. The 
Practice of Cultural 
Analysis: Exposing 
Interdisciplinary 
Interpretation, 
(Stanford: Stanford 
University Press,my 
1999). 
9. An additional 
temporal layer 
occurred when the 
actors, inspired by the 
group performance, 
started to improvise 
and make their own 
images, beyond 
enacting the roles 
assigned to them. 
Although author and 
filmmakers remain 
relatively independent 
from each other, it is 
relevant to realize that 
the preposterous logic 
I have developed as 
a historical approach 
squares perfectly with 
Davoine’s conception 
of history, particularly 
(but not exclusively) 
as it plays itself out in 
madness. See the clip 
“Françoise on Time” 
on the video section 
of the film’s website, 
as well as many 
remarks in her books: 
La mère folle (Paris: 
Arcanes Recherche 
Psychanalytique 
(1992, 1998), La folie 
Wittgenstein, (Paris: 
Du Croquant, 2012), 
among others;, 2008), 
and the scenography of 
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her encounters with
 people from the past 
registered there. 
10. Sigmund Freud, 
Totem and Taboo, 
trans. A. A. Bril, (New 
York: Moffat Yard and 
Company, 1918) 
11. The idea that 
images are received, 
rather than created 
by the author, was 
suggested to me by 
Kaja Silverman’s recent 
book Flesh of my Flesh, 
(Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2009), 
in which she discusses 
this attitude of artists 
apropos of Rilke 
(2009). Davoine’s book 
is an extraordinary 
integration of theory 
and images, “facts” 
and fiction. Among 
other advantages, such 
as more subtlety and 
strong identification, 
this integration 
allowed the author to 
do justice to the lived 
experiences in the 
case histories of her 
patients without being 
the dominating one 
who writes them.
12. This is quite a 
heavy task, especially 
if we also consider 
Benjamin’s paradoxical 
view of translation. 
“While content and 
language form a 
certain unity in the 
original, like a fruit and 
time, these two worlds mingle. The theoretical and political importance of 
the film lies in a positive representation of mad (or psychotic) people and 
a constructive interaction between mad and sane people through which 
both learn things from the other that help them to live their lives. Within 
the film, medieval Fools strike precisely that balance. This motivates their 
participation. Hence, in this inter-temporally ambiguous representation of 
“madness”—rather than in relation to the book as such—our first allegiance 
was positioned.
Only a carefully thought-through image of the Fools and their 
contemporary counterparts, the Mad, can do justice to this allegiance. To 
achieve this, an ontological uncertainty with bearing on epistemology was 
our primary guideline. The Fools raise an ontological question that also 
bears on the status of the images and what they convey in their various 
inter-ships. The Fools are not mad but play the fool. So how do we know 
what “being mad” is, and whether that is different from playing? Can 
you play what you are, and be, or become, what you play? This is the 
theoretical question that undermines the authority of the archaeological 
thrust of psychoanalysis. It lies at the heart of Davoine’s social approach 
to psychoanalysis, her attempt to make the theory and practice less 
individualistic and do justice to psychoanalysis as a profoundly social 
science. And it is what makes the psychoanalytic space a medium, as we 
attempt to show with the installation.
For us, as filmmakers, this question was doubled by another one, 
concerning intermediality: how can we make that unknowability or 
undecidability itself visible, convincing, and productive? The book 
integrates theory, fiction, and documentary. Here lies the debt the film and 
its images have towards the book. As a “faithful” intermedial translation, the 
film owes it to the book to make that integration of traditionally separate 
domains visible, and to the book as theoretical object in the sense described 
above, to draw conclusions, visual and otherwise, from that integration.12 
Storying Madness
Film is an uncompromisingly temporal medium. This translation was 
possible because there is also a story: not as a fiction for its own sake but 
its skin, the language 
of the translation 
envelops its content 
like a royal robe 
with ample folds,” 
Walter Benjamin 
writes in “The Task 
of the Translator” 
(Illuminations, ed. 
Hannah Arendt. 
[London: Pimlico, 
1999], 761968, 75). See 
also the discussion in 
Jacques Derrida1983 
(93-161). For an 
extensive discussion 
of Benjamin’s text, see 
Chapter Two of Bal, 
Travelling Concepts in 
the Humanities. 
13. Freud’s Dora case 
has been extensively 
interpreted. See, for 
example, Charles 
Bernheimer and Claire 
Kahane, In Dora’s 
Case: Freud-Hysteria-
Feminism, (London: 
Virago, 1985). There 
are serious issues 
involving a lack of 
empathy on the part 
of the analyst. In 
Françoise’s case, Sissi 
blames her for refusing 
identification. Later, the 
analyst is able to see 
the justification of that 
blame. 
14. The author, the
as a frame for these images, a setting for the madness, and a focus for the 
staging of the “mad.” The story, in book and film, runs as follows. After a 
taste of the practice of psychoanalysis, the analyst’s opening words tell us 
that “tomorrow is All Saints’ Day.” That makes “today” the Day of the Dead. 
As it happens, Françoise has just learned of the death by overdose of one of 
her psychotic patients. Discouraged, she blames herself and psychoanalysis 
for this tragic failure. She enters a deep crisis. She is tempted to abandon 
her job at the psychiatric hospital. While pondering this decision in the 
courtyard of the hospital, she takes a book on the Middle Ages out of her 
bag. It is a book that her dead patient had requested she bring to him. As 
she rummages through her bag and finds the book, the enigmatic figure of 
Mère Folle appears—as if out of the book, as its interpretant. A number of 
medieval Fools accost Françoise, challenging psychoanalysis as fraudulent. 
Their primary grievance is the privileging of word over gesture, the 
individual over the group, and the past over the present. Their leader, Mère 
Folle, is depressed because the Fools do not obey her anymore. She sits 
down in silence. With a wink to iconography, she takes the pose of Dürer’s 
famous engraving Melencolia I (1514). In the film, the apparition of the 
Fools out of the book is embedded in the entire scene in the courtyard. 
In turn, this scene comes out of the contemplation, in the hospital in 
Finland, of Brueghel the Elder’s painting by the psychoanalyst treating 
Sissi, Françoise’s first patient who, like Freud’s Dora, had dismissed her as 
incompetent. Thus, the film confounds any attempt to construct temporality 
as linear.13 
A discussion ensues in which a dead-pan Françoise remains situated 
in the present without being astonished by the confrontation with another 
historical time, and responds as if in discussion with colleagues. It is this 
ability to remain her professional self while engaging with other times and 
their discourses that is her primary strength, both as an actress and as an 
analyst. It is her own unique inter-ship. That discrepancy in tone was our 
interpretation of the rather even tone of the argumentative prose in the 
book, in spite of the exuberance of the descriptive parts. We translated this 
tone into the main character’s calm acting, although the text does not reflect 
on it per se.14 But we had to visualize a point that the book makes constantly 
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main character-narrator, 
and the actress are 
the same person. For 
clarity’s  sake I will 
use the first name 
“Françoise” when 
speaking about the 
character, actress, and 
narrator, and use her 
last name “Davoine” 
when talking about the 
author of the book. 
15. Since we had a 
micro-budget for the 
film, we mostly had to 
work with volunteer 
actors. The Musical 
Nurse (Leticia Bal) is a 
professional musician 
(www.rumbadama.nl) 
but amateur actress, 
while the Head 
Nurse is a prominent 
professional actress 
(Olga Zuiderhoek) who 
generously donated 
her time for the project.
yet only implicitly, which is the ontological uncertainty, mentioned before, 
of madness between enactment, being, and being-perceived. From this 
uncertainty the film derives its philosophical experiment. Since playing the 
fool is the Fools’ profession, this took a specifically theatrical form, in an 
inter-arts probing of the relationships between theatre and cinema. The film 
shows how the Fools can no longer be separated from the Mad. These begin 
to mingle with them, even to chant comments drawn from medieval poems 
under the direction of the Musical Nurse who tries to calm them with their 
own means, all of this adding to the panic of the Head Nurse.15 
But a professional crisis is harder to actually live than Françoise had 
thought. The fools end up irritating her out of her determination to resign 
from her job, and reluctantly she returns to work. There she is caught by 
her affection for and identification with the patients and the occasional 
success of a treatment. As she talks with patients, the distinction between 
the Fools and the Mad fades away slowly. This ontological uncertainty of 
madness is made visible by several means, one of which is the quite simple 
ploy of actors playing multiple roles. The most striking instance of this is 
the performance by French actor Thomas Germaine. In the courtyard he 
shows up among the Fools under the name of Antonin (later, his last name 
turns out to be Artaud), a self-proclaimed although anachronistic friend 
of sixteenth-century writer Étienne de la Boétie. As the latter cannot speak, 
Antonin speaks for him. In the hospital scene, Germaine is a patient, also 
called Antonin. And in the trial, he acts out Artaud’s combination of genius 
and madness. 
At this point one already wonders if these figures are one, two, or 
three persons. Moreover, at the beginning and towards the end of the 
film Germaine shows up at Françoise’s office as a homeless man seeking 
treatment, and the short treatment they undertake together is successful. 
His name is Herlat, another name for Harlequin, the King of Death that 
Mère Folle conjures up during the trial, at which point, however, not 
Harlequin but Artaud appears. All these characters may or may not be the 
same “person.” 
The medium of space, performative as it is, shapes each appearance 
differently. This questions the ontology of personhood embedded in the 
16. The anti-
individualism that 
permeates the book, 
and that the film 
represents by many 
different means, is its 
primary philosophical 
point, as well as its 
proposal for clinical 
psychoanalysis. For 
a philosophical 
questioning of the 
individual subject, 
see Cadava et al. eds. 
Who Comes After the 
Subject? (London: 
Routledge, 1991)
17. The shabby 
character of the theatre 
fits the street character 
of the Fools’ theatrical 
practice. It goes 
against the grain of the 
cultural dominance 
Pierre Bourdieu has 
termed “distinction” 
(Distinction: A 
Social Critique of 
the Judgement of 
Taste, translated by 
R Nice, [Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, London, 
1985]).1984). The 
scene of the Trial 
conforms subtly to 
the traditional genre 
of the “sotie.” See 
Jean-Claude Aubailly, 
Le Monologue, le 
dialogue et la sottie, 
(Paris: H. Champion, 
1976) and Jelle 
Koopmans, Le théâtre 
des exclus au Moyen 
Âge, (Paris, Imago, 
1997).
18. An excellent 
social-cultural study 
of the sotties in the 
Netherlands, and its 
continuity with carnival, 
is Herman Pleij 2007 
De eeuw van 
questioning of madness and brings to this question another philosophical 
relevance. What is at stake in this playful enactment is the notion of the 
individual subject itself. And, since the book proposes a theory of a social 
psychoanalysis, where the small histories of the patients converge with the 
tragedies of History, this questioning through casting is loyal to the book’s 
theoretical thrust.16
Meanwhile, Françoise is abducted by two Mafiosi and so begins a 
strange voyage. She is taken to the Middle Ages—or rather, the Middles 
Ages surface in the present, in a small, somewhat shabby Parisian theatre. 
There, Françoise is brought before a court where she is blamed for her lack 
of insight, and psychoanalysis’ repression of gesture in favour of words. The 
episodes of that court case confront her, and us, with the sane reasoning 
behind the Fool’s mask. The alleged fools come from the tradition of 
“sotties,” a political theatre from the late Middle Ages, a kind of carnival 
of Fools. These are the Fools who merged with the patients at the hospital. 
Their arrival thus becomes a political moment.17 
As opposed to the patients, the fools have impunity. Françoise, consistent 
in her in-betweenness, cannot help herself listening and discussing these 
issues seriously. During the trial, in the form of imaginary or dreamt 
dialogues, the narrator’s own literary and philosophical sources also mix in 
with great thinkers such as Antonin Artaud, Ludwig Wittgenstein, TS Eliot. 
There is even a glimpse of Friedrich Nietzsche.18 
For the narrator, this dialogic traversal of time is also a return to her 
own past. Her boundaries—in time, space, and identity—melt down. 
The relevance of this undermining of individuality becomes clear when 
she becomes capable of identifying not only with her patients, in whose 
adventures she begins to participate, but also with her former self. To 
underline the difficulty of this connection the younger Françoise speaks 
Spanish, a “mother tongue” different to her French. 
Two patients from the past stroll through Françoise’s world when she 
least expects it. These are a woman named Sissi—doctor Davoine’s first 
failure of twenty years ago—and the timeless, elfish Ariste who dies at the 
beginning only to resurface regularly throughout the film as an “inspector” 
(or as Françoise’s bruised super-ego), as a source of gossip, and as a 
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memory. These two phantom patients constantly confront Françoise with 
the difficulty of her work and the danger, yet likelihood, of failure. Ariste 
becomes Françoise’s spectre in the combined philosophical and sociological-
political sense put forward by Derrida, his death a sacrifice to earn insight 
into the importance of identification, a kind of gift.19 
From these combined travels Françoise gains the ability to practice 
immersion into the deliria of her patients, in order to become a fraternal 
equal to them. Only through such an “extreme identification” will she be 
able to carve for them an auxiliary space wherein the “catastrophic regions” 
that generated their madness can be confronted. Throughout the story, the 
narrator has been doing precisely that, becoming an equal to the “fools” and 
the “mad.”20  
It is on this hopeful note that, during the turmoil of the Carnival of 
Basel, the immersion into the medieval universe of folly, the story ends. 
Between the trial and the Carnival, Françoise’s day is not over. She continues 
to treat Herlat, then pays an overdue visit to the grave of her former teacher, 
the sister of her father’s Resistance friend, inveterate Spanish freedom fighter 
Don Luis, as well as to that of the latter’s “mad aunt,” who also haunts her 
childhood memories. 
Theoretical considerations, initially only occurring in the mind of 
the narrator, will be taken over by fools, colleagues, patients. Thus, the 
film produces theory: a theory of madness as bound up with historical 
catastrophe; of psychoanalysis as an emphatically social science and 
practice; of the individual subject as fatally but also, helpfully porous, 
inseparable from other subjects; of images and their capacity of speech; of 
speech as imaged and imaginative.
Socializing Madness
With these complexities in mind, you will not be surprised that for Michelle 
and me it was as difficult as it was important to remain loyal, not so much 
to the book as to our own desire to make a film based on it. The theoretical 
thrust compelled certain visual decisions that, at first sight, have little 
to do with theory. Here, I want to discuss some of these decisions as a 
contribution to the question of how images help intellectual work, the 
de zotheid. Over de nar 
als maatschappelijk 
houvast in de 
vroegmoderne tijd, 
(Amsterdam: Bert 
bakker, 2007). The 
book, and, to a lesser 
extent, the film contain 
many quotations from 
Artaud’s (1958 [1938]) 
The Theater and Its 
Double, (New York: 
Grove Press, 1958).
19. Jacques Derrida, 
The Gift of Death, trans. 
D. Wills, (Chicago: 
University of Chicago 
Press, 1996). On 
the importance and 
risks of empathy and 
identification see 
Dominick LaCapra, 
especially 2001, 
Writing History, Writing 
Trauma, (Baltimore: 
The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2001) 
and Jill Bennett, 2005 
Empathic Vision: 
Art, Politics, Trauma, 
(Stanford; Stanford 
University Press, 2005).
20. The notion of 
“extreme identification” 
was Michelle’s and 
my interpretation of 
Davoine’s method. The 
term “catastrophic 
regions” is Davoine’s.
question of subjectivity as crucially social, and the inter-ship between 
cinema and theory. 
The first, major intervention concerned the individualism and the 
linguistic bias that the Fools impute to Françoise. But her entire project 
is a battle against the individualism that keeps the Mad impermeable to 
psychoanalysis, and cuts them off from society. Instead, her life’s work 
consists of attempts to preserve psychoanalysis as a social science. In the 
book this discussion, obviously, can only remain verbal, although it is, 
narratologically speaking, astonishingly “jumpy,” interrupted by small 
occurrences and verbal punning, misunderstandings and anachronistic 
“errors,” and never leading to a compromise or resolution. Here, a dilemma 
arises that determines how the film can contribute to insight into sociality: 
do we do justice to the discussion, to the author’s project, or to the story, in 
our intermedial work?21 
In Davoine’s book, the story concerns Françoise’s crisis and the voyage 
of discovery that leads to her insight. It is a kind of Bildungsroman or travel 
story, what the Spanish created in the tradition of the picaresque novel. If 
this form were respected in detail, the film would become too centred 
on a single character. In particular, this form would not do justice to the 
fact that in Françoise’s eyes the Fools have a point. We deployed several 
levels of dispersal in order to avoid an individualistic, autobiographical 
interpretation of a story that, in fact, harbours important theoretical insights 
that go against individualism. Thus we sought to revise the very notion of 
autobiography; in particular, the auto of it. These dispersals make the story 
more general while preserving the singularity of the characters involved. 
This was our first, primary act of loyalty-by-betrayal.22
Another dispersal concerns language. The film is multilingual. Actors 
from different countries speak their own languages. The multilingual 
speeches became images of a multi-cultural Europe, as well as of a certain 
kind of social madness present in the contemporary world. At the same 
time, they became almost utopian images of the possibility to communicate 
against all odds. The psychoanalyst’s dilemma, for example, is shared 
by other psychoanalysts. Here, the intermediality itself is theoretically 
relevant: images build bridges because they help to communicate across the 
21. See Peter Verstraten, 
Film Narratology, trans. 
S. van der Lecq, for 
a film narratology 
that is consistent 
with my own 
narratological concepts 
in Bal, Narratology: 
Introduction to the 
Theory of Narrative, 
(Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2009).
22. The second analyst 
is played by Marjo 
Vuorela, also a real-
life psychoanalyst. 
Françoise Davoine 
commented on this 
point: “I feel not 
betrayed but expanded” 
(augmentée, personal 
communication, 
January 3, 2010). Many 
of our interventions
 started out as need, 
were compelled by 
circumstance and 
received theoretical 
support retrospectively, 
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boundaries that separate the sane from the mad, the contemporary from 
earlier times, and different cultural and linguistic communities from each 
other. The psychoanalyst establishes a connection, however briefly, between 
the function of images and the accumulative effect of the oral transmission 
of poetry. The tension in this multilingualism between a utopian vision 
and a certain kind of madness became a rich source of inter-play with the 
ambivalence of the book toward classical psychoanalysis, the uncertainty of 
madness, and contemporary European reality.23 
Former patients of doctor Davoine are now either independent or live in 
a “half-way house” where they are getting ready to re-integrate into society, 
elsewhere, under the guidance of other psychoanalysts. As an example of a 
visual-linguistic pun that makes a theoretical point tangible, this house is 
in “the North,” because retrouver le nord is the French phrase for coming 
to your senses. Just as the patients there struggle to come to their senses, so 
does psychiatry. 
As I mentioned in the interview, to film this half-way house we ended up 
on the historically layered Seili Island, a small island off the coast of Turku, 
Finland. The sense of the place gives a peek into the layering of history in 
the present. On this island, a former leprosy hospital had been converted 
into a hospital for the insane, only to close in 1962, an embodiment of 
Foucault’s History of Madness. After the disappearance of leprosy in that 
part of the world, the old hospital cared for the mad (mostly of the lower 
classes and more often women than men), who were never to return home 
to the mainland. A chilling requirement for admission, we learned, was 
that patients bring their own coffin. This is one example of how setting 
contributes to a further—in this case, historical—clarification of the bond 
between madness and society.24
Indeed, an aspect that matters enormously for filmmaking is setting. 
It is where the scenography can be inscribed. Apart from their obvious 
movement, film images are set in spaces that have continuous presence 
and, hence, a function in a film as much as in society. We needed to evoke 
what Mexican psychoanalyst Alberto Montoya Hernández has called 
“landscapes of madness.” This beautifully ambiguous concept refers both to 
the imaginary places in which madness elects to situate itself, and to images 
or half-way through 
the making of the 
film. But I will not go 
into the adventures of 
a micro-budget film 
production here. 
23. There is an obvious 
connection between 
this multilingualism 
and my video 
installation “Nothing 
is Missing,” (see http://
www.miekebal.org/
artworks/installations/
nothing-is-missing/)
24. Thanks to Mia 
Hannula of the 
University of Turku, 
whose constant 
support and help has 
been indispensable 
to us. The beautiful 
documentary “Women 
of Seili” by Mikaela 
Weurlander (2008), 
which we saw only 
later, gives background 
information about the 
hospital that converges 
astonishingly with 
of landscapes that appear mad or are hospitable to the Mad. Through this 
concept, madness can be placed firmly in the world.25 
We wished the landscape of madness to be both full of the real history 
of madness and slightly anachronistic, in order to connect it to the 
contemporary social world. Two parts of the film are set in psychiatric 
hospitals: the treatment of Sissi by another analyst and the work Françoise 
does once she returns to her job. The location for the first part is an obsolete 
psychiatric institution in Nokia, Finland, called Pitkäniemi Hospital. It is 
reminiscent of the hospital at Seili. The location for the other part is in 
Amsterdam, the Netherlands: an art deco building housing an art school, 
with large echoing spaces that respond to the idea of collective treatment in 
more ways than one. The images show that this cannot be what is known 
as group therapy, because the patients are too deeply immersed in their 
madness to connect to each other. This isolation, in turn, comes across 
through the echoing sound characteristic of the large halls, which makes for 
difficult understanding. The echo surrounds each patient with an isolating 
auditory halo. 
The patients’ only sociality is with Françoise, a situation that burdens 
the latter with the responsibility to begin restoring sociality with and for 
them. Thus, a drawback of that particular location—its terrible acoustics—
ends up contributing to making concrete, to auditively “image,” the central 
problem in madness according to Davoine’s book: the broken social bonds 
that leave the patients in what she calls “catastrophic regions,” a term that 
resonates with Montoya Hernández’s “landscapes of madness.” For Davoine, 
these regions—mental and geographical as well as historical—harbour the 
violence that generates madness, sometimes generations later.26 
These sites are “turned mad” by the discrepancies between the normal 
goings-on and the interference wrought by the Fools. Seili Island and its 
hospital convey the sense of isolation that is a silent stream in the film. In 
the South of Spain, we set the visit Françoise pays to Don Luis, the old 
family friend and Resistance fighter, in order to broaden the scope of the 
historical violence invoked. Here, a visit to the cemetery dates the film to 
that long 31st of October, the Day of the Dead, as well as placing it against 
that other paisaje de la locura that was the Spanish Civil War. These are 
our film. The primary 
source on this 
“invention” of madness 
as a hospitable disease 
after leprosy remains 
Michel Foucault. The 
English edition of 
his Madness and 
Civilization is an 
abridged version 
of Folie et déraison: 
Histoire de la folie 
à l’âge classique, 
originally published 
in 1961. A full English 
translation titled 
History of Madness 
was published by 
Routledge in 2006 
25. On the sociology 
of space, a feminist 
perspective is offered 
by ElisabethElizabeth 
Grosz in Space, Time 
and Perversion. Essays 
on the Politics of 
Bodies. (New York: 
Routledge, 1995). 
On the concept 
of “landscapes of 
madness,” see Alberto 
Montoya Hernández, 
2006. Paisajes de 
la locura. (México: 
Paradigma, 2006).
26. The bond between 
landscape and social 
life has been brought 
to the fore by the work 
of social geographers, 
of which Edward Soja’s 
1989 book Postmodern 
Geographies has been 
a pioneering instance. 
See also his more 
recent Postmetropolis 
(2000). These studies 
do not specifically 
focus on madness 
and/as landscape, but 
relating these two 
fields would be a 
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settings where, precisely, history can act up again, as it does in the lives of 
the patients.27 
But, in spite of the complicity of such settings, the film helps us think 
precisely because it is not realistic in the traditional sense. It actively 
avoids this rhetorical mode. We have several reasons for this avoidance 
of straightforward realism. A realist reading will fail to do justice to the 
inextricable bond between the film and the reality it critically engages—the 
most important inter-ship. I am even inclined to generalize this point: 
realism by definition distorts, obscures, and otherwise bypasses the bond 
between art—or literary works—and reality. That bond, complex and 
questionable as it is, remains a primary requirement for art to matter 
socially.28
In the same vein, we maintain the term “Mad” for the characters that 
hover in a state of patienthood. The clearest synonym of this word is 
“mentally ill,” rather than the American euphemism “mentally disabled,” or 
worse, “challenged.” Whereas “ill” is a cultural diagnosis of a state that does 
not preclude competent agency, “disabled” is precisely the opposite of what 
the characters turn out to be, and suggests permanence; as the film shows, 
the mad are rather hyper-abled.29 
Rather than avoiding the language, society is in need of different views 
of a phenomenon that has a history. For this revision of the views the old 
term may be more useful, reminding us as it does of the dangers inherent 
in the views they express, not in the terms per se. Thus, such euphemisms 
do the opposite of performing retrospection; they erase what needs to be 
re-visioned. The authentication of psychosis compels a commitment to such 
a strongly historical yet reversed, or “preposterous,” politics of time.30
The impossibility of realism—its fundamental unrealness—is most 
clearly demonstrated by the “actual” psychoanalytic treatments we staged. 
As mentioned, in the course of the film there are two supposedly completed 
treatments of patients: a shorter one of a man called Herlat, taking place 
in Françoise’s office, at the beginning and toward the end of the film; 
and a longer treatment of Sissi, taking place throughout two-thirds of 
the film in Pitkäniemi Hospital. These two sequences insist upon the 
cinematic problem of realism. If played out earnestly, they would have to be 
 
worthwhile endeavour.
27. One funny but 
revealing incident in 
present-day social 
reality demonstrates 
what a “landscape 
of madness” can 
be. When filming an 
incident of the Fools 
chased away from the 
public place, the 
actors playing cleaners 
who got rid of the 
medieval Fools were 
later approached 
by resident visitors 
of the Parisian flea 
market, who thanked 
them for getting rid 
of “those crazies.” In 
other words, the action 
created a space where 
madness threatened 
to take over, and the 
guys in uniforms were 
automatically taken to 
be the authorities, who 
“saved” the market 
from madness.
28. I am currently 
devoting three books 
to this question of the 
political force of art. 
One of these, Of What 
One Cannot Speak 
appeared in Spring 2011 
from the University 
of Chicago Press. On 
realism, a philosophical 
inquiry into its bond 
with objectivism, see 
Hilary Putnam, ‘The 
Craving for Objectivity,’ 
New Literary History 
15.2, (Winter) 1984: 229-
239, and ‘Objectivity 
and the Science/Ethics 
Distinction,’ in Realism 
with a Human Face, 
(Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University 
Press, 1990). 
29. That other 
euphemism, “mentally 
challenged,” again if 
literally interpreted, 
implies the possibility 
to wilfully improve the 
state of one’s mind. All 
euphemisms based on 
this word “challenged” 
imply the worst 
connotations of the 
ideology of the 
documentary in style, with the voyeurism that comes with it, and boring in 
length. If tampered with, as we were compelled to do, they might become 
demeaning to the seriousness of the pain of the (fictionalized) afflicted 
patients, thereby conforming to the usual caricature. 
Schizophrenic Sissi, while coming from a very simple working-class 
family, imagines herself to be (a double of) the Empress of Austria-Hungary. 
This feature of the character became a great asset for visualization as well 
as empowerment. Instead of or in addition to having her talk about her 
imperial status and dignity, we dressed her in a variety of fancy clothes, 
different for each session, with fitting hairstyles and jewellery. As it turned 
out, and in no small measure thanks of the superb acting of Finnish actress 
Marja Skaffari, the moving moments in the treatment when Sissi is evoking 
extremely painful memories are set off against her exuberant dress with very 
convincing, indeed contagious, poignancy. Thus we were able to create a 
gripping image sequence, give Sissi her own voice, and stage her madness 
without demeaning her through the symbolic violence of representation. 
Founding Violence
In an ordinary social context, violence is done to many on an everyday basis. 
Physical violence, the linguistic violence of hate speech, of the failure to 
listen and to acknowledge, to serve as the “second person” without whom 
subjectivity cannot mature, and the symbolic violence of representation: 
all these forms of violence have the potential to drive their victims mad. 
This potential constitutes another inter-ship, a porosity between “kinds” of 
people, a porosity that makes society even more eager to draw firm, fearful 
boundaries. What Mère Folle argues, demonstrates, and cinematically 
“inflicts” on its viewers is precisely the breakdown of those boundaries. The 
social relevance of madness lies in the uneasy but indispensable awareness 
of the generative bond between violence and madness. 
Sissi, the film slowly and half-heartedly reveals—half-heartedly because 
her mental illness stands in the way of or shields her from full awareness—
has been made mad by sexual abuse and parental neglect. Herlat’s 
condition is bound up with war in previous generations of his family. Aziz, 
a Palestinian patient, has been driven to mad violence in response to 
American dream: 
challenges can be met; 
who fails is herself to 
blame. Euphemisms, 
well-meant as they 
are, are misguided 
attempts to take the 
sting out of language. 
They are misguided 
because, precisely 
through their erasure 
of negativity in their 
connotations, they 
erase the persistence 
of the socially current 
views the older terms 
express more honestly.
For a general study 
of euphemisms, see 
Keith Allan and Kate 
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Shield and Weapon, 
(Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1991). 
30. In addition to my 
book mentioned above, 
The Practice of Cultural 
Analysis (1999), see 
Cesare Casarino, ‘Time 
Matters: Marx, Negri, 
Agamben and the 
Corporeal,’ Strategies: 
Journal of the Theory, 
Culture and Politics 
16, no. 12, 2003: 
185-206. Whilst mine 
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article is perhaps 
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politically enforced impotence. At the end of the film, the aging Don Luis 
explains to Françoise how close he came to madness in the concentration 
camp of Mauthausen. 
The insight I find most important to draw from all these connections 
between violence and madness is what a cliché would phrase as “learning 
from the past”: something “we” (here in the universal sense) never quite 
manage. Psychoanalytic space is that space “in-between” where the past 
can become a new start instead of something that crushes us. The dead 
Ariste, who, in one moment, looks on at the scenes of madness played out 
before him, is the embodiment of that deadly, but potentially regenerative 
past. At another moment Sissi, as if emerging from the office door to which 
she seemed glued like a painting, embodying the two-dimensionality the 
hospital imposes on its patients, insists on the continued presence of the 
past in a shot that captured her in-between state perfectly. This is her 
opportunity to make a new start after having been stuck, to “get better,” as 
she says several times. 
This simple insight is key to the question of the relationship between 
art and the political. It is not as if there is art, some of which happens to 
be political. Political art is art because it is political; it is art by virtue of its 
political “nature.” Neither art nor the political are defined by subject matter. 
They are domains of agency, where acting becomes possible and can have 
effects. In the case of political art, that agency is one and the same: it “works” 
as art because it works politically. My reflections have been devoted to the 
inseparability of those two elements, which nevertheless remain irreducible 
to one another. Political art shows that they can neither be equated nor 
severed. Instead, they deeply impact each other. Exploring what makes art 
political, I seek to explore where art’s political efficacy can be located: how it 
performs, how it exerts agency, and what the point is of art’s political agency 
for the larger domain of society. Art is itself an inter-ship. 
